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THE POWER OF LANGUAGE BEYOND WORDS: LAW
AS INVITATION
Emily Fowler Hartigan*
There is no speech, there are no words, but their power
goes out across the earth.
Psalm 19:4-5
A voice from the dark called out,
'The poets must give us
imagination of peace, to oust the intense,
familiar
imagination of disaster. Peace, not only
the absence of war.'
But peace, like a poem,
is not there ahead of itself,
can't be imagined before it is made,
can't be known except
in the words of its making,
grammar of justice,
syntax of mutual aid.
A feeling towards it,
dimly sensing a rhythm, is all we have
until we begin to utter its metaphors,
learning them as we speak.1
-Denise Levertov
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; B.A. Swarth-
more College; J.D., Ph.D. University of Wisconsin.
I thank for their patience, comment and support, readers who made good of this text:
Milner Ball, Ruth Colker, Tony Feffar, Louis Newman, Randy Philips, Carol Ochs, Paul
Rasor, Carol Rose, Tom Shaffer, John Snowden, Howard Vogel, James Boyd White, and
Toto. Also those who listened and responded at the 1989 annual Law and Religion confer-
ence at Hamline Law School, especially Drucilla Cornell, Frank Alexander, Douglas Sturm,
Steve Scherschlieght, Sandy Levinson, John Flym and Marie Failinger. And the philoso-
pher, the judge and the rabbi.
I DENISE LEVERTOV, Making Peace, in BREATHING THE WATER 40 (1987).
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At the basis of this world are values which are simply
there, perennially, before we ever speak of them, before
we reflect upon them and inquire about them. It owes its
internal coherence to something like a pre-speculative
assumption that the world functions and is generally pos-
sible at all only because there is something beyond its
horizon, something beyond or above it that might escape
our understanding and our grasp but, for just that reason,
firmly grounds this world, bestows upon it its order and
measure, and is the hidden source of all the rules, cus-
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I. Beginning
This is a story meant to serve as an invitation, a story of
blessing-and a confession, an exhortation, even a bit of a ser-
mon-about Law. I am telling you this both to give account of
where the words come from, and to let you know where this essay-
story is situated, in my life and in the communities in which I find
myself. I teach law, and I am writing this for a law review. The
footnotes of my self-location include the post-modern, post-Hol-
ocaust, post-nihilist writings of political and legal thinkers who
have come far enough to assert the Reality of Evil, and whom I
would call to join in naming the Good. 3
The communities in which I am located extend from the dis-
creteness of law reviews to the domain of thought, feeling and
faith that theologian David Tracy suggests is mystical-pragmatic.
4
In terms of my story, my community also includes particular peo-
ple who read the first draft of this, and their responses, and you
the reader, of whom I am going to make a request. The first people
who read this were some of those who lived it. You will find in
the following pages the story of the philosopher and the rabbi. The
philosopher read this and understood my argument about what the
implications for dialogue about law are for a reasoning person
called to love God with her whole being and love her neighbor as
herself; the rabbi read, loved, commented, and affirmed. It was
the law colleagues who read this who changed the beginning.
The blessing text, the scripture of this story-essay is the spe-
cific blessing of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you blessing and
curse, life and death ...." As an aspect of that blessing, Law is
3They include Richard Rorty, Mark Tushnet, Stanley Fish, Bruce Ackerman, Michael
WValzer, and Thomas Nagel; see THOMAS NAGEL, THE ViEw FROM NOWHERE (1986); see
infra notes 29, 30, 45, 49, 105, 106, 138.
4 David Tracy, The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Mod-
ernity, and Postmodernity, 50 THEO. STUD. 548, 564-69 (1989). Tracy's language is con-
ducive to this phrase, but he uses "mystical-prophetic." Another author who takes Tracy
to mean something mixing mystical with worldly concerns is Michael Perry, who in his
forthcoming book Love and Power calls Tracy's idea "mystical-political." M. Perry, Love
and Power (rev. ed. Sept. 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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an INVITATION to fuller life, more deeply than it is force, vio-
lence, coercion, death. Even to Robert Cover, Law is the com-
mand of a good God; in this story, it is also the invitation of a
loving God, a welcoming cosmos. We can choose freely rather
than merely obey carefully, because we have been blessed first.5
We can trust reality and our true selves, because they are primarily
good. This sense of Law as inviting is in part the neglected femi-
nine face of the world.6 It is an affirmation of the outlines (and
inlines) of life. We can recognize in the face of life and the counte-
nance of the other, Law's invitation as the tracing, the imprint of
the good. I will try to fashion two sorts of bridges into my expe-
rience of this blessing text of law, and ask you to supply the third.
First, I will try to tell you what I hope to do. Then I will relate a
parable, and finally I will ask you to revisit what you have read.
A. Blessing and Bridge
To start (I have cheated a little, giving myself a couple of
pages to lead up to this), I ask the reader's blessing. There are
two main reasons for this, and one defensive one. The first is that
this telling requires openness and some trust, and blessing is the
medium of invoking what is needed for trust. The second, in
reality, is that it is blessing I am talking about in relationship to
the law, and it is that blessing, that goodness, which I need for
the courage to write such personal, feminine and out-of-the-main-
stream stuff, stuff that is, if Robert Cover is right, written in the
face of violence.7 I find that frightening. The final reason is that
any truth in what I am about to confess, to tell, to advocate, is
not my possession. I have lived some of this truth, but never alone
and always imperfectly. My conversation partners include all
whom I have mentioned, some who come in the course of the
essay, and one who appears at the very end of the story. The other
5 DIETRICH BONHOFFER, MEDITATING ON THE VoRD (D. Gracie trans. 1986).
6 See infra note 72; see also ELISABETH MOLTMANN WENDEL, A LAND FLOWING
WITH MILK AND HONEY (1986).
7 See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). Such writing
is far from unheard-of, however. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Marie
Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law,
13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (narrative sym-
posium 1989); ROBERTO UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984).
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persons in the conversation, the story, have given me courage,
and asked for more.
I am asking, as part of blessing, for something rather strange
and perhaps presumptuous: I ask that you read this text twice.
There are reasons from theory and practice for my request. In
practice, I have been told by almost all readers that it took them
until the second time to become connected, to understand the
invitation, sometimes even to make much sense of the text. Their
affirming reports of their second rounds fuel my presumption; so
does my reflection on why, even to friendly readers, this text is
not easy to read.
There are four reasons I can identify. First, the text is about
interweaving mystery with knowledge, and that means it is by its
own declaration half-hidden. Second, the text is, I hope, feminine;
because we do not yet really know what feminine consciousness
is, speaking it is deeply tentative. Third, the nature of texts is that
they belong to reader as well as writer, and I have tried to leave
that space open (and thus unexplained). Until the reader and the
writer meet in the text, the text is incomplete; re-reading continues
the process. And fourth, (akin to the second but also distinct) is
the fact that our stories, our histories, have nearly no tradition of
women's voices, so that even if I am true to my own voice, you
would have a much more difficult time recognizing either its truth
or its coherence, than you would stories of which you have heard
prior versions, men's stories.
The role of mystery is explored throughout the Article, but
the nature of text and the feminine needs some initial exploration.
At its center, the feminine text is related to something legal theorist
H.L.A. Hart says about law. When Hart talks about the "internal
point of view" (what now might be called the view of the subject),
he gives an account of how the solely external, "objective" viewer
will miss something integral to law. The external analysis will
portray stoplights as "a natural sign that people will behave in
certain ways, as clouds are a sign that rain will come."8 This, Hart
notes, misses the dimension of social life, the internal experience
of the driver that the light is a signal for her to stop, a signal to
which (or to its prior, habit-forming instances), I would add, she
can say yes or no. That internal decision is what I address in my
8 HENRY HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 87 (emphasis in original) (1961).
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request for a double reading: I ask that you read the text to get its
context, so you can approach it with a mixture of you and the text
that is best for you.
The relationship between reader and text is sacred. This is
not in the sense of solely theistic thought (indeed, though the
language may seem to belie it, this entire text does not require a
"belief in God;" as Buber says, "Whoever goes forth in truth to
the world, goes forth to God")9 but in the sense of the birthing of
self and becoming that attentive reading can bring forth. The in-
tegration of all that is ostensibly in the text "will not come to
fruition other than in the living receiver of the story being told." 10
Philosopher Paul Ricoeur notes that the process of composition
does not realize itself in the text but in the reader-this is the risk
and what literary critic J. Hillis Miller calls the "ethical moment"
of reading. This risk is not taken in the void, however: ethics
have stories and laws and bases of trust.12 One of the bases of
trust, aside from mutual blessing, will be your first reading.
Ricoeur says that a text is a projection of a new universe; 3
this is almost exactly what the late Robert Cover said about law.14
One face of the new universe to which this text aspires began very
recently, as English professor Carolyn Heilbrun narrates in Writing
a Woman's Life.15 This writing by women about women is partic-
ularly difficult because, as Ricoeur's analysis of texts details, all
texts come to us mediated by the kinds of stories we have heard. 16
We are constituted by a narrative identity (much as legal philos-
opher Ronald Dworkin says law is like a serial novel, a continuing
story)I7 because "that which we call subjectivity is neither an
incoherent succession of occurrences nor an immutable substance
incapable of becoming." Rather that identity is "built up into a
9 MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 143 (W. Kaufmann trans. 1970).
"0 Paul Ricoeur, Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator, in FACTS AND VALUES: PHILO-
SOPHICAL REFLECTIONS FROM WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN PERSPECTIVES 122 (M.C.
Doeser & J.N. Kraay eds. 1986).
11 J. HILLIS MILLER, THE ETHICS OF READING (1987) (especially ch. 1, "Reading Doing
Reading" and ch. 6, "Re-Reading and Re-Vision: James and Benjamin").
12 Id. (especially ch. 2, "Reading Telling: Kant").
'3 Ricoeur, supra note 10.
14 Cover, supra note 7.
I5 CAROLYN HEILBRUN, VRITING A WOMAN'S LIFE (1988).
16 Ricoeur, supra note 10, at 129.
17 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986).
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living continuous overlap of all the lived stories. Thus, the stories
told must emerge from this background. In this emergence the
story guarantees man. ' 18 Sadly (yet inviting to the future), that
emergence has in the past guaranteed just what Ricoeur names-
man. Women have lived, but they have not written their stories
or their experiences under the law. Women's stories today rest on
almost no history of women's writings. And I am a woman.
So I must risk trying to tell a story from a vantage that does
not yet fully exist. French feminist Luce Irigaray suggests that
women cannot yet know who they are, nor the nature or perhaps
existence of the feminine unconscious (she also suggests the ob-
vious correlate to the fragility of feminine consciousness: "...
how can anything be known about the 'masculine"' in such a
context?).' 9 The first flowering of women's writing is happening
now. That is why I feel this text as a risk; I invite you to share
that risk, and to read twice so that the story may begin to reveal
its law more fully, and come to light between us.
As I ask for this re-reading, I want to say two things: first, I
do not know the "secret" of how this reading works; second, I am
not trying to trap you or me, but to move free of what Wittgenstein
calls the (implicitly false) enchantment of language, and yet court
a wiser re-enchantment. This is the nature of the Word. As Miller
reveals, in discussing re-vision and re-reading, both American
writer Henry James and Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin tap
the underlying paradoxes of the word in law and text. James puts
it this way:
[Writing] gives itself [to the writer, and that which] finally
'renders,' is a flower that blooms by a beautiful law of its
own . . . in the very heart of the gathered sheaf; it is
there already, at any moment, almost before one can
either miss or suspect it-so that in short we shall never
guess, I think, the working secret of the revisionist .... 20
18 Ricoeur, supra note 10, at 131.
19 LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE (C. Porter trans. 1985) (esp. ch. 7,
"Questions"); see also Bly & Thompson, What Men Really Want: Love, Sex and Intimacy
in Changing Times, in CHALLENGE OF THE HEART (J. Welwood ed. 1985).
20 Miller, supra note 11, at 118-19 (quoting Henry James).
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Miller reflects: "If we shall never guess the secret, that is not
because James has not given us as much of the secret as one
person is likely to be able to communicate to another." For James,
the re-reading calls forth a "due testimony, . . . re-assertion of
value, perforating as by some strange and fine, some latent and
gathered force, a myriad more adequate channels. '21 Miller's con-
clusions get close to the matter: "The text is not the law or even
the utterance of the law but an example of the productive force of
the law."'22 Citing Benjamin's formulation of the paradox of the
wordless word, he notes about translation as a form of re-reading:
"[b]oth original and translation are inadequate translations of an
original which can never be given as such, just as the law as such
can never be formulated in so many words, in any language."23 I
have done, will do, my best to give as much of the secret, as much
as is given to me, and ask you to meet me in the reading and re-
reading. I am not trying to obscure what I know: I know that I do
not know, and what can be apprehended will best come to be,
between us.
The "original" to which Miller alludes is a text that is always
liminal, always on the edge of becoming. Thus my text can never
capture it. The inherent limitations of text make explicit the in-
terpretive burden that is on the reader-yet that burden "is light,"
is part of the invitation. This text will be to some extent what you
make it. Milner Ball suggests that a humanistic reading "is avail-
able for only those who come to a text with the heart and will for
such a reading. '24 (Key reviews of Richard Posner's law and lit-
erature tome suggest that he was unmoved by the greatest in
Western letters because he read from the stasis of disengagement,
remaining closed as a person and thus writing in bad judgment.)25
The authority of the text lies with the reader, in the end. As I
argue below, that is the gift after Babel, the gift to the listeners,
the readers, of law and text: much is a matter of your decisions
as reader.
21 Id. at 119 (quoting Henry James).
SlId. at 121.
23Id. at 123.
2 Milner Ball, Confessions, 1 CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND LITERATURE 185, 193
(1990).
2- See Peter Teachout, Lapse of Judgment (Book Review), 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1259,
1266-68, 1283-84, 1292-95 (1989); see also James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn
from Literature? (Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2014-15 (1989) (both reviewing
RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)).
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1. The Theory
The invitation of law is beyond words, mine very much in-
cluded. It comes from One whose ways are not ours, and it reaches
individual expression only after having been lived into existence
among many and perhaps all particular people. It is as simple as
Socrates' notion that justice in the soul, justice in the republic and
justice in the world are of one form, and that it is love that calls
us into being as the motive source for good in philosophy and the
cosmos; it is as complex as the attempt to say a truth that resides
in the whole of the universe (well beyond a law review article, no
matter how detailed the footnotes . . .). Law is like Torah, the
inviting, never-ending creation and discovery of the lineaments of
a living space given to us in love, spoken to us every moment and
at sacred moments (on Mt. Sinai to Moses; here and now to you
and me). The laws that we have written and spoken in constitutions
and statutes and decisions and folkways are, like this Article,
attempts to put the Law into words. This idea is what animates
ideas of our Constitution as unwritten; it is the "living spirit" of
law that Justice Cooley tapped; it is the "law of the land" of Magna
Carta. 26 It is Law as "imprinted in the heart" and being of the
human person, and always moving towards expression in
language. 27
I want to point to Law as this creative possibility, this invi-
tation, to make law as we experience it move toward Law that
can speak to power. This does not abolish power, does not redeem
law fully, but it is a turn, a beginning, a seeing of law anew. It is
the change of heart of Christian metanoia, the turn and return of
Jewish teshuva, the vertigo of koan in Zen. It is a new way of
seeing the world of law, so that the law may become new. It can
both conserve and transform the laws as we now know them.
Words will never catch it, and so I will not be hiding the ball in
this, but I will drop the ball. I trust you to pick it up when you
26 People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107 (1871) (Cooley, J.); Thomas Grey, Origins of
the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Emily Hartigan, Law and Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life
Through the Spirit of the Law of State Constitutions, 6 J. L. & RELIG. 225, esp. nn.94-
159 (1988).
27 See WALTER LIPPMAN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 77 (1954); Peter Demetz, Intro-
duction to WALTER BENJAMIN, REFLECTIONS at xxii (1986).
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can, and run with it28 ... because it is still in the making (as the
playing field itself transforms), and that project needs your
participation.
2. The Parable
Once there was a young woman who lived in the Midwest.
Her parents owned an apple orchard, and grew ten different va-
rieties of apples. Next door to her family's orchard was a smaller
orchard owned by a Vietnamese family, who had escaped by boat
after the fall of Saigon, and had taken many years to accumulate
the down-payment on land. The son of the Vietnamese family had
spent his high school and college years working full-time and
studying full-time to learn horticulture and orchard management,
and he was very proud of his family's achievement. He had de-
veloped one of the three varieties of trees in their orchard, and all
three were about to reach maturity. He cared only for apples, and
never noticed people outside his family.
The young woman was intrigued by these "foreigners" and
their close family, hard work, traditional observances and self-
contained pride. In addition, the blossoms on their trees seemed
at least as beautiful as those on her family's trees; they smelled
mysteriously fragrant; they tantalized her.
The young woman wanted to taste the strange apples, but was
too shy to speak up. She could think of no way of reaching the
apples besides climbing the fence in darkness. She thought about
what such a climb would be. She might fall, and not be found until
the next day. She might be caught, and be greatly ashamed. She
might damage the tree in her nervous picking, and feel deeply
guilty. She might be snagged by unseen barbed wire or a booby
trap. In her confusion, she mentioned her plan to her father. He
said that those apples were not theirs, period. He told her that to
go over the fence would be trespassing and theft.
Her mother suggested that, although her father was right about
the law, she might take her desire as a sign of life and think about
why she wanted the apples so much. At first, this just drove the
young woman to distraction, because she began to develop an
28 The editors noticed this obvious use of a sports metaphor; this is an ironic retention
of an attempt at translation for the sake of my colleagues at Nebraska.
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obsession about the apples, and that was pretty silly. She realized
she did not want to have to steal. She asked herself why she was
going bananas over apples she had never tasted, was considering
invading neighbors' land, and was spending days ruminating over
booby traps. She went out to the trees, to get another sense of
why she was so drawn to them, and she was met by the sensations
of the beautiful color, the intriguing shape and the slight but deli-
cious smell of the small apples over the fence. At the same time,
she realized that she was being driven nuts by someone else's
forbidden fruit and imagined disasters, without ever having talked
to the owners, and she burst out laughing at herself, amid her
smiles of enjoyment at the sight and fragrance of the apples. She
resolved to talk to the son the next time she saw him. The sound
of her laughter came to the son, who looked down from his perch
in a nearby tree he had been pruning, to see a wandering, smiling,
laughing young woman whom he knew to be the "spoiled" daughter
of the well-to-do neighbors. The look in her face was unmistakably
one of desire, and delight in his beloved apples, and the next day,
the son and daughter met. As the mother suggested to her daughter
that the longing she felt was to be lived out as an invitation, so
the seemingly punitive prohibitions of the father were really the
patterns of a gift coming into being; seen with heart, mind and
humor, the law of trespass could illuminate more than it could
dominate-and perhaps the nature of the law itself could be
changed.
B. The Devil, Too
The academy, the law reviews, have already accepted the
reality of death, of evil, of curse. For example, Michael Walzer
reviewed Stuart Hampshire's book on justice, and agreed with the
author that what unites humanity is not a single substantial mo-
rality but a recognition of (and implicit agreement upon) the great
evils of life. 29 Rorty and Ackerman assert that evil exists 0 and join
Walzer in the defensive stance of avoiding the evil of common life,
of law, rather than affirming the good. John Rawls constructs a
29 Michael Walzer, The Minimalist (Book Review), NEw REPUBLIC, January 22, 1990,
at 40 (reviewing STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1989)).
30 B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Rorty, infra note
104.
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theory of justice that is, as my students said, a theory of guilt
avoidance, not of life embrace. 31 Arthur Leff's poignant answer
to Roberto Unger's cry to God to speak was a negative litany of
Wrongs (Pol Pot, Hitler, slavery), though he finally said it, that for
the Law, "there is no one like unto the Lord. '32 Leff earlier re-
sponded to Unger with a letter that said in essence that it was
necessary for God to exist, and maybe God did exist, but, feigning
the role of the Devil, "[I]f [God] exists, Me too. '33 That gets the
essential tie between the two, and the order right: first the Good,
then Evil.34 We have what Judith Shklar concedes to be some
shared sense of injustice, 35 but we have yet to claim the positive
that must have preceded that negative: injustice is not-justice.
Injustice is a lack of something that we must value, to miss it so.
Blessing, good, life, are not only Real, as Real as evil, but they
are to be chosen, are being chosen, have been chosen. My tradition
tells me that God asks that I do justice, not merely avoid injustice,
that I love tenderly, not merely avoid causing suffering to others,
that I walk humbly, not merely that I step on no unnecessary toes.
So I start with blessing, in writing about law, but I recall the curse.
Yes, Professor Leff-the Devil, too.
In order to do good within the Law, we will have to witness
to the evil. Robert Cover talks about witness, an "insist[ence] in
the face of overwhelming force that if there is to be continuing
life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant's law. ' 36 The law that
is coercion and curse is not Cover's Law; his Law is "the projec-
tion of an imagined future upon reality. ' 37 It is a commitment to
what is not yet, but that can be lived into being. To live so
faithfully, Cover tells us, toward the "imagined triumph of the
normative universe-of Torah, Nomos-" over death, involves the
witnesses' resolution that "any future they possess will be on the
31 See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
32 Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE LJ. 1229, 1232;
ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1984).
33 Arthur Left, Memorandum, TO: Roberto Unger, Professor of Law, etc., FROM:
The Devil, etc., RE: Your Knowledge and Politics, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879, 889 (1977).
3The primacy of blessing, of the good against which evil is contrasted in order to be
known as evil, is present in all major traditions of spirituality. Some consider it a minority
theme; those who claim it, consider it true. For an example, with annotations within the
tradition of the People of the Book, see MICHAEL Fox, ORIGINAL BLESSING 257-58, 277-
78, 307-27 (1983).
35 JUDITH SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990).




terms of the law to which they are committed (God's law). '38
Cover's voice knows the context in which such dangerous witness
takes place.
C. Context
In his powerful Violence and the Word, Robert Cover says
the startling but obvious: the words that judges speak, kill. "The
judges deal pain and death."39
The law takes children from parents, puts people in jail, dev-
astates plans and lives, gives freedom, and allocates shelter, food
and means for existence. In the courts and on the streets, the
function of law's language is more than a story to enchant or a
rhetoric to persuade. It is also the medium through which we
intentionally dispense pain, advantage, freedom and death. As
Cover reminds us, the judge is insulated from the results of. his
words by layers of roles, so that the implementation of judges'
words is left to functionaries; without all the structure of social
organization, words would not be the same well-padded deeds
distanced by a legal system.
To call such a system of language practical wisdom may mask
its lethal character, but it reminds us that law language is not
philosophy. This is crucial because while we consider, in the con-
text of this essay, language in its more abstract character, we are
living in a society that is putting people to death. As we ponder
whether it is time to stress divergence or to move to reconstruc-
tion, to emphasize sameness or dwell in difference, children are
being taken, placed, misplaced. This is not to devise a rhetoric of
haste, because some of the deepest wisdom of the moment advises
that we have, and should take, time.40 Yet we cannot deny that
we are living in a "moral emergency; ' 41 we are reminded to locate
our discussion. It takes place amid violence both overt and covered
by layers of custom, "comity" and internalized legalism.
We are also called to justify the attempt to do with language
what we cannot-to make sense out of the world, to discern its
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1609.
40 See Rowan Williams, The Suspicion of Suspicion: Wittgenstein and Bonhoffer, in
THE GRAMMAR OF THE HEART 36 (R. Bell ed. 1988).
41 David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
2152, 2224 (1989).
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meaning. The legal system will continue to operate as best it can,
even were it to devolve to the quasi-chaos of revolution or totali-
tarianism, whether or not it can "mean what it says." The one
thing that law means is business: the police officer will arrest
people today, here, and put them in jail. The law business goes
on, and either it will mean the continuation of the status quo, or,
in some modest but real part, it will yield to our actions and our
words that attempt to give it meaning beyond mere force. Our
justification for the search for the source of the meaning and power
of words is thus the confluence of acknowledged violence, and
hope.
How does the meaning ever emerge from the chaos? How do
so many people of so many divergent histories manage to talk at
all? How do words of law embody justice in addition to coercion?
How can the judge and the criminal ever communicate? 42 How can
we make sense of a system in which we are all innocent, we are
all guilty?
D. Turning
Legal language kills, but the words of law can also give life.
Law separates, but it can also join. Law is force, but it is also
translation. 43
I present here the idea and stories of the spirit of the law as
medium44 of translation, both among our radical pluralities and
between our deepest consciousness and what lies so deep that it
reaches our ineffable oneness. Because the spirit is real, it allows
us to communicate when we talk, and to reach beyond the words
of our speech. We bother to talk about the meaning and power of
words in law because we hope to strengthen the tendrils of meaning
that run through the system of organized violence and non-vio-
lence. In some sense, we share the desire to minimize the aspect
of violence and maximize the aspect of meaning. Law is force and
words are force, 45 but they are also freedom.
42 See Cover, supra note 7, at 1609; Williams, supra note 7, at 401, 405.
41 Cf. Clark Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about Law as Language,
87 MIcH. L. REv. 2459 n.* (1989) (citing James Boyd White's newest book, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION (1990)).
44 See MILNER BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER (1985) (describing law as medium).
45 Stanley Fish, Force, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883 (1988).
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As Kant knew that any attempt to know what really ties the
cosmos together (and how it is so tied) was run through with
"transcendental illusion," so we know that in every act of meaning
there is meaninglessness. In every use of language to affirm or
create life, there is non-life. Our every affirmation is inherently
not quite right.46 But we continue to try because we know that the
cosmos is forgiving to this extent: somehow we live and love and
celebrate, as well as die and hate and mourn. And we continue to
choose life, to use words, to inhabit language with the commitment
of each sentence which we can manage to hold as close to reality
as we know how. Even as we read texts that deconstruct what we
hold sacred,47 we find that we cannot but reach to embrace again.
Those who would reduce this to the moment, to instrumental
pragmatism (in its inherent contradiction, captured by the queries
"Works? Works by what measure and from whose perspective?"),
or to infinite non-justification, continue to write as if there were a
truth in whose honor debunking takes place. Or as if there might
be Someone who could get to their hearts by refuting their argu-
ments, battering down the doors of their minds in order to rescue
their starving souls. It is time to say more about what we cannot
say, time to use language to talk about what language cannot do,
so that we may wonder at and affirm what it manages to do.
Language manages to connect us, although without an ac-
knowledgement of the benignity, the grace of mystery, we cannot
begin to explain that connection. We can use language to claim
(but not to explain) that mystery. As mystery, it cannot be fully
predictable, but it can be almost apprehensible in language. Ap-
prehension and proof are two different things, however, and those
requiring proof may not be open to apprehension. They may re-
quire that their "God-shaped hole" 48 be filled by reason (or words)
alone, and may thus remain empty. Reason is a powerful tool,
even in its many guises, 49 for clearing space. Love is the only tool
4 See MARK TAYLOR, ER[R]ING (1989).
47 See ELISABETH SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER (1985) and ELISABETH
SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, BREAD NOT STONE (1987) (rejecting Scripture as not fundamentally
trustworthy because it is androcentric).
43 Salman Rushdie, The Book Burning, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Mar. 2, 1989, at 26, col.
2 (discussing the initial reaction to his THE SATANIC VERSES (1988) and his own beliefs
(and emptiness) days prior to the Iranian declaration of his death sentence). The phrase
originates in this passage: "we all have ...a vacuum that only God can fill." BLAISE
PASCAL, PENSEES § 7 425 (1892).
49 See Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997.
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for creating space. Waiting for the space to be filled is more than
most of us inveterate writers and talkers can bear. What I propose
is that we can begin to talk about the unspoken, saying what we
can, knowing we cannot get it right, if we have taken the emptiers
seriously. The emptiers, the deconstructors, tell us that we must
know nothing before we can affirm something. They remind us of
Christian kenosis,50 of Jewish tzimtzum,5 1 of the emptiness of
God's withdrawal from creation. God is with us, many of our
traditions tell us, as shekhinah and spirit, but that abiding presence
will not fill the space uninvited. God will not trespass upon us.
We cannot know to let the space be filled, unless we open our ears
to the invitation. This image of reciprocal need for invitation might
be the stuff of tragedy, the infinite standoff of who goes first, if
we did not know that we have been loved first. One of the signs,
one language of that love, is the spirit of the Law. (There is also
gift in the Letter, but it is the spirit about which we have been
mute.)
It is Law as the Creator's first gift of love that I want to
portray. This Law gives freedom, places it, points it out to us. We
have been invited, are invited, and it is in pursuit of this dimly
remembered invitation that we have been taking apart meaning as
we had known it-because of the intuition that a deeper, fuller
meaning was at the bottom of the invitation. The seemingly neg-
ative enterprise of analysis, skepticism, deconstruction, even nih-
ilism, rests on the suppressed premise of felt loss, on the intuition
that by taking apart we will find that "something more" for which
we long. It is Law, in search of which we reject commonly under-
stood law, not as the command of parent but as the invitation of
friend or lover, which always grows to replace what we have
rejected.
This invitation to Law is only honest if it admits that it in-
cludes death. Even were capital punishment abolished, we do as
a legal system what results inevitably in death, and we know it.
Yet, despite us, death includes life. What we hope for is that life
and death have meaning now (not just in some "after" life) and
that hope returns us to language.
50 See MAGGIE Ross, THE FOUNTAIN AND THE FURNACE; A THEOLOGY OF TEARS
AND FIRE (1985).
51 See, e.g., Lawrence Fine, The Contemplative Practice of Yihudim in Lurianic Kab-
balah, in JEWISH SPIRITUALITY II 65-66 (A. Green ed. 1987); GERSHOM SCHOLEM, MAJOR
TRENDS IN JEWISH MYSTICISM 260-68 (1946).
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In particular, I will try to show that once we move beyond a
rhetoric of rights into a fuller legal language reclaiming duty, we
should experience that prospect of integration of right and duty as
sufficiently attractive in itself so that it "works" by desire, more
than by avoidance or fear. Law in this sense is not at first com-
mand, but at first blessing, invitation. In pursuit of this, I will
suggest that the feminine penchant long missing from academic
discourse best conveys invitation, and that masculine discourse
tends to the unnecessarily directory or imperative mode.
E. God Talk
In order to tap the strongest tradition of invitation, I will use
religious language that is as non-sectarian as I can manage and
will argue for the use of such language in public discourse. 52 1 do
not want to suggest that raw particularism in one's relationship to
ultimate reality will be the best medium of communication in the
public realm. Rather, while I will contest the explicit and implicit
rejection of religious thought and speech in the public sphere, I
attempt to give much of the impetus for these arguments its due,
and enfold their insights in the sense of language that I suggest.
In my tradition, Thomas Merton has said that the saint does
not need to use God-talk, 53 and Sebastian Moore observes that the
truths we need to hear speak to "that burning human centre" that
is not restricted to the overt traditions of theism. 54 I am not a
saint, nor do I suppose my fellow citizens or even my fellow
academics are. I will suggest that opening up God-talk IN THE
ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE TO ANOTHER WHAT THAT
LANGUAGE TELLS THE SPEAKER, is a good thing. That is,
directly contrary to the real fear of many commentators, I most
trust the person who is first genuinely grounded in her own rela-
tionship with her God, but I find her even more trustworthy if she
can know that in this plural world, much of what makes sense to
her will be hard to grasp for others. It is the speaker's very
cognizance of the limits of her understanding of God (in my tra-
52 See MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY
(1988); see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITU-
TIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 213-16
(1984); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
13 THOMAS MERTON, NEW SEEDS OF CONTEMPLATION chs. 1-6, (1961) (esp. p. 24).
'4 SEBASTIAN MOORE, LET THIS MIND BE IN YOU 130 (1985).
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dition, humility) that must accompany her confession of authentic
faith-and-reason. 5
F. Without Word or Name
Underlying these two themes is the recognition that there are
things about language that we cannot understand. Some of what
Emerson calls tacit references 56 or Kant calls categories of per-
ception can be brought to the cognitive surface; some can only be
lived. We must, in theologian Tad Dunne's words, "be careful not
to think we can explain Mystery; ... we must be equally careful
not to call Mystery those things which Mystery impels us to un-
derstand. '57 We are ultimately helpless in the face of the Other,
as even the arch-rationalist Kant admits, but we are also called to
try to understand. 58 And there is a spiral quality to this understand-
ing, as David Tracy reminds us: "In and through even the best
speech for Ultimate Reality, greater obscurity eventually emerges
to manifest a religious sense of that Reality as ultimate mystery. 59
There is reason to reflect on Mystery, both because we are con-
stituted to seek to know, to recollect, and because we can accept
and even embrace not knowing. "[Mysteries] have to be named,
to school the mind and heart, and to be celebrated. '60
II. The Philosopher and the Rabbi 61
I want to tell you stories about two of my friends. One is a
Christian philosopher, one a Conservative rabbi. I met the first
when we appeared together on a panel on advocacy in the law,
the second at a research colloquium two years later. One contends
that I may not use religious language, and may not even use secular
language so long as I am religiously motivated, in the realm of
public law. The other expected to do his task, and go home without
5- See, e.g., Terence Penelhum, Skepticism and Fideism and Myles Burnyeat, Can the
Skeptic Live His Skepticism?, in THE SKEPTICAL TRADITION 287 (M. Burnyeat ed. 1983).
56 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Over-Soul, in RALPH WALDO EMERSON: ESSAYS &
LECTURES 390 (1983).
57 TAD DUNNE, LONERGAN AND SPIRITUALITY 152 (1985).
-' See, e.g., Steven Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2230 (1989).
59 DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 108 (1987).
60 SEBASTIAN MOORE, THE CRUCIFIED JESUS IS No STRANGER 63 (1977).
61 For the priest and the minister: see id. and infra note 71.
Law as Invitation
having done any real translation beyond the portion of the Talmud
he had agreed to do, but found that two very different languages
about God, two different ways of life, could meet.
In my first semester of teaching after over eight years of
practice, I agreed to be on a panel on legal advocacy with, among
others, philosopher Robert Audi, a practicing Christian then on
leave at Notre Dame. For my presentation, I wanted to use the
definition of advocacy that William Stringfellow advanced at a talk
that I attended in the midst of my practice, a definition that fit the
best lawyers I knew.62 I had discussed the Stringfellow notion with
those men in my firm (it was men, back then), and they agreed
with it: the advocate must be willing to become vulnerable on
behalf of another, even unto death. (They also understood where
it came from, in their lives-they were midwestern, tight-lipped
Christians underneath it all.)
I told Audi in my opening sentence that I was violating his
norm, that I could not but speak as religiously motivated, and
certainly not when I was being most nearly real, most whole, most
faithful to myself (not to mention God). We had a series of lunch
and dinner conversations, in which I came to know him as a deeply
thoughtful and sensitive person, someone authentically concerned
about moral issues, and about God. We remain friends, and it is
from his reprint of his article that my notes for my attack on his
position here come. He is a delightful and good person, and he is
wrong.
The second friend attended a research colloquium in an inter-
faith context, but privately resolved to leave Jewish-Christian dia-
logue to others. I felt it was the proper thing to pursue that dia-
logue, but also wanted to avoid the phenomenon that a theologian
friend who had attended the same colloquium four years before
described: everyone at the colloquium fell in love with everyone
else. That sort of encounter can be lived very faithfully, lawfully,
but it tends to be exhausting. Reversing my usual priorities, I
pursued task primarily; reversing his, he pursued relationship (and
task). On the last evening, when we were called to inscribe mes-
sages to each of the other thirty participants, I wrote to him: "What
can I possibly say?". He replied with his translation of Psalm 19
6 See William Stringfeilow, A Lasyer's Work, 3 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. Q. 17, 19
(1982).
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that begins this Article: "There is no speech, there are no words,
but their power goes out across the earth." From my almost an-
tinomian Catholicism, to his Conservative Judaism, there has been
a bridge that allowed us to translate the untranslatable differences,
knowing that we would often be wrong but mostly we were right.
A. From Nothingness
What underlies the best of speech about ultimate reality, that
speech that, Tracy reminds us, 63 turns again to unknowing, is the
drawing of an infinitely deep, infinitely inviting Mystery. There is
a vast difference between this sense of Mystery and the emptiness
that Stanley Cavell says that unrepentant skepticism sustains.6r
Wallowing in nihilism and abiding in darkness are two very differ-
ent spiritual stances; one refuses to trust and the other is possible
only because of trust. Nihilism as the dark night of the soul is
unspokenly pregnant with new life; nihilism as endpoint or the
locus of endless rumination is increasingly willful non-life. Dark-
ness is emblematic of tomb and womb, each with the possibility
of resurrection and birth, each to be welcomed. To face darkness
with at best resignation rather than expectation, is to indulge in
stasis that tempts the law of momentum, leaving those caught in
the vortex of negation to continue in the dark. To know darkness,
as the necessary and so attractive concomitant of light is to wel-
come Mystery and know it as the focus of our unarticulated longing
for Cavell's "something more." Given the striking richness and
acknowledgement of the dark in Cavell's work, "something more"
would have to be something transcendent.
It is this transcendence after immanence that can return to
the ordinary, to language after the "disease" of philosophy (Witt-
genstein's key image of language and self-conscious reality), and
find it and the language-user transformed. After the journey into
philosophical self-alienation and self-consciousness, the journeyer
is changed. Even if the words of her language remain within the
vocabulary that she first left, the power with which she can live
those words has returned with her, from the realm of power beyond
61 Tracy, supra note 4.
64 STANLEY CAVELL, IN QUEST OF THE ORDINARY 148 (1989).
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words. Even if the words seem simple, it is a simplicity after
complexity that aspires to wisdom. Torah can never be contained
in books, nor the truth in words. In that sense, the attack on
correspondence theories of language is apt-truth is much too
strong to be fettered by our human language. Yet the Truth deigned
to inhabit that language, so that Truth could be manifest even in
such a limited medium; this inhabitation of words is what draws
words toward what cannot be said. As Maimonides said, the Law
is all that (and more than) every student and teacher may think to
ask or answer about it, through time. And those who speak.the
truth in law are like Moses-slow and unable really to speak, yet
enabled to do so by the Mystery of Presence. Because that Pres-
ence is not confined to words, but speaks in all creation (Psalm
19), our speech will never be adequate to correspond to reality.
Yet the infinite of reality is Spoken, and so we live in a cosmos
Spoken beyond words, gifted to us in life, which invites us in a
never-ending dance of light and dark in which our power to speak
grows.
The tracings that guide us in this growth, are the Law. It is
the image, the imprint of divine Law cited by Cover,65 that pulls
us toward our roles in co-creation of the cosmos. The way of this
law is first connection then distinction, first truth then deception,
first blessing then consequence, first freedom then obligation. We
were together before we were separated, as Plato's myth reminds
us, 66 and we are to be together again, enriched by the times apart.
Therefore, law is first continuous, reflecting in all realms its initial
imprint-only a moment later is it also discontinuous, the public
law with its violence as the distortion of the law of faithful com-
munities of memory affirmed by political theologians Neuhaus and
Hauerwas. 67 It is the connection that allows Cover to put Torah
into the public realm and allows us the thin margin through which
we can hope to redeem legitimized coercion and to claim even for
secular law a continuity with Law as invitation.
65 Robert Cover, Panel Discussion: Theological Perspectives, 5 J. L. & RELIG. 95,
102-03 (1987).
66 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC at Book VII in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (H.
Cairns & E. Hamilton eds. 1961).
67 RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1984); STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CON-
STRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC (1983).
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B. The Feminine Invitation
The language of invitation would be more likely to appear in
feminist writings than in white male discourse. Power commands;
"powerlessness" looks to persuade. Although the question of what
constitutes real power contains a number of internal distinctions,
the power of male dominance in the history and the present hier-
archy of law is unavoidable. Eight men on the Supreme Court
embody the reality replayed through all the political and legal
institutions of the United States. By and large, white "Christian '"
men are the rulers, the law-makers, the law-appliers. 69 And so
their image of law, either from God or from humankind, tends
towards command. Even Robert Cover, advocating that we com-
bine an ethic of rights with an ethic of obligation, of mitzvah, and
that we make a new Torah together, calls it a matter of command. 70
Cover makes the difficult move from the image of divine law to
that of human law through the invocation of Torah and runs the
stunning risks of disclosure and of exclusion from his own tradi-
tion, but he does not quite bring along the sense of the gift of law
as invitation. He stays with command, as do theologians Michael
and Kenneth Himes in their explication of trinitarian political the-
ology and contemporary community.71 Although the Himeses por-
tray a world of grace that lifts us beyond the dilemmas of self-
interest and invoke a trust in Reality that is necessary to generate
any generous notion of political community, they revert to the
vocabulary of command. Their political theology is self-con-
sciously relational, and supports the feminist vision of an ethic of
care, but slips back into directive rather than the initiative of God's
first love.
69 The quotation marks are the suggestion of my research assistant, Art Morrow, who
takes an anti-positivist view of Christianity.
6 Mary Becker discusses the figures and implications in Becker, Politics, Differences
and Economic Rights, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 169, 179-81.
70 Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. &
RELIG. 65 (1987).
7' Michael Himes & Kenneth Himes, The Myth of Self-Interest, COMMONWEAL, Sept.
23, 1988, at 493; Michael Himes & Kenneth Himes, Rights, Economics & the Trinity,
COMMONWEAL, March 14, 1986, at 137. Their political theology of the trinity rests on the
imagery of "'God' as the name of a relationship and the poles of the relationship" (lover,
beloved, the love between them); God as "the very fullness of relatedness." Individualistic
politics based on negative freedom "rather than the freedom for self-gift in relationship,
freedom for participation in community" will tend to exclude, to minimize interdependence,
and to ignore that the "ending of oppression is for the sake of the oppressor as well as the
oppressed."
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Feminist spirituality and spiritual politics, in contrast, stress
the wonder and inherent goodness of creation, such that its binding
forces are experienced as blessings to be pursued ever more
deeply. Theirs is a theology of grace, law as guide, life as trust-
worthy, power as the power of the desirability of the good. 72 As
Socrates said that the only real power is the power to persuade
another to do the right thing for the right reasons, 73 feminist writ-
ings know that persuasion is a gentle draw, more than a compelling
force, an invitation more than a command.
This turn to law as desirable (much as Socrates described the
good as the object of desire and our love for the good and beautiful
as the motivation for our pursuit of the good), is the turn that the
apostle Paul attempted and the rabbinic tradition has pursued for
the last 2000 years. 74 It is constantly in danger of takeover by
punitive legalism or reactive antinomianism, 75 but it is the face of
"sought" that beckons more deeply than it threatens. It is creative
more than competitive, so that the call to law as gift does not
require the negation of something, but rather the acceptance of
affirmation. As feminist jurisprudes note, women tend to create
72 See, e.g., GEORGIA HARKNESS, WOMEN IN CHURCH AND SOCIETY: A HISTORICAL
AND THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY (1972); HELEN LUKE, WOMAN: EARTH & SPIRIT (1984);
SALLIE MCFAGUE, MODELS OF GOD (1987); VIRGINIA MOLLENKOTT, GODDING (1987);
MOLLENKOTr, WOMEN, MEN, AND THE BIBLE (1977); CAROL OCHS, WOMEN AND SPIRI-
TUALITY (1983); JUDITH PLASKOW & CAROL CHRIST, WEAVING THE VISIONS: NEW PAT-
TERNS IN FEMINIST SPIRITUALITY (1989); ROSEMARY RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK:
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEOLOGY (1983); CHRISTIN WEBER, WOMANCHRIST (1987); WEBER,
BLESSINGS, A WOMANCHRIST REFLECTION ON THE BEATITUDES (1989).
7' PLATO, THE MENO in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (H. Cairns & E. Ham-
ilton eds., 1961).
74 E.P. Saunders, in PAUL AND PALESTINIAN JUDAISM: A COMPARISON OF PATTERNS
OF RELIGION (1977) confronts the misapprehension of "the view of Rabbinic religion as
one of legalistic works of self-righteousness," id. at 33ff, giving ample citation to Jewish
commentary on God's gift of Torah as an act of love and blessing, e.g., id. at 104ff, while
discussing a more adequate interpretation of Paul than the supercessionism (new covenant,
new testament replacing the old) that fostered anti-Semitism. See also Paul M. van Buren's
trilogy, A THEOLOGY OF JEWISH-CHRISTIAN REALITY 1: DISCERNING THE WAY (1980), A
THEOLOGY OF JEWISH-CHRISTIAN REALITY 2: A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF THE PEOPLE
ISRAEL (1983), A THEOLOGY OF JEWISH-CHRISTIAN REALITY 3: CHRIST IN CONTEXT (1988);
AND FRANS JOSEF VAN BEECK'S CONVERSATION WITH EMMANUEL LEVINAS'S WORK IN
LOVING THE TORAH MORE THAN GOD?: TOWARD A CATHOLIC APPRECIATION OF JUDAISM
(1989). Jewish texts attesting love of Torah are superabundant (GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE
SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW (1953); ELLIOT DORFF & ARTHUR ROSET, A LIVING TREE: THE
ROOTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW (1988); JACOB NEUSNER, FOUNDATIONS OF SHAT-
TERING THE MYTH OF RABBINIC LEGALISM (1990); Arnold Eisen, Re-reading Heschel on
the Commandments, JUDAISM 1 (Spring 1989)).
75 Antinomianism (against law (nomos)) is a reaction to legalism, holding that moral
law is of no use (and perhaps of negative value); instead actors rely entirely on faith,
intuition or spirit.
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by naming, and their use of words is relational. 76 This naming is
also transformation, but not by coercive power. The constructs of
the liberated feminine are the best of Paul Ricoeur's "second
na'vet6' '77 because they represent a move from contained yet hi-
erarchical sameness, challenged into a new wholeness of differ-
ence-and-sameness. They do not forget the context, however; they
know we are located in a violent as well as aspirant world.
It is because the invitation is to transformation that it both
requires trust and does not claim to overcome the inherent Mystery
of growth or to effect a total triumph over violence. Law itself is
both violent and transformational; we do not have to smash all
contexts78 to find that transformation, but the freedom to move
from commanded patriarchy to a generative, 79 integrative human-
ity does require acknowledgement and at least partial transcend-
ence of the structures of domination. However, as the perennial
debate over whether or not ordinary language philosophy is inher-
ently conservative reveals, language itself has the seeds of its own
change. The images and connotations that arose with the use of
"good" or "just" or even "law" in the past included the very
wellsprings of the urge to transcendence that is never completed.
The "ought" of words of value is always nascent in them; they are
pregnant with transformation. It is the very stretching, reaching,
longing for something more, which words evoke beyond words,
which is the invitation of the power of language about the good
always to grow beyond itself.
C. Translation and Trust
There is danger, however, in the return to language, when it
is either the "old" ordinary language redolent with domination or
76 Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1383 (1986).
77 PAUL RICOEUR, Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought in THE SYMBOLISM
OF EVIL (1967).
7
8 ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); R. UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPAR-
ATIVE-HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MIL-
ITARY SUCCESS (1987); R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987).
79 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Forvard: NOMOS and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983).
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the dominant language in our always plural linguistic world. When
English is that into which Spanish is to be translated, or Hebrew
is to be translated, the speakers with less power risk that their
particularity, their identity, will be lost in translation. When the
feminine attempts to speak in her own voice, she may be silenced,
translated away, erased from "rational" discourse.80 When the
ordinary person comes to court, her story may be lost in the
translation into legalese, that arcane jargon that marks the court
Insiders. Thus, the first voices to translate should be those of the
vulnerable, rather than the powerful. And any hope for a new
language in this second na'vet6, depends upon the knowing, willing
participation of those who have been wounded by power. That is
why, as I will note later, the movement to the spirit for translation
requires a special participation by those who most easily know
themselves to be Outsiders. By giving such power of initiation to
blacks, Jews, Hispanics, women, we may be reminded that, as
Robert Burt suggests, the good news is that we are all Outsiders.81
It also safeguards those who are different, in their difference.
Particularly in the writings of post-structuralists and post-modern-
ists, the Other is suggested as primarily the feminine;82 the femi-
nine is not identical with the female, but in a society of deeply
gendered roles, the feminine voice is always fragile, and risks being
lost in translation. 83 The Other has been, in Western letters and
theology, the Wholly Other, God. If the newest aspect of the face
of the Other is the feminine, women walk and speak on dangerous
if sacred ground. There is not only benign spirit in the world of
translation; there is also evil, and thus grave risk. The solely
commanding law of the father, law professor Jerome Frank's
spectre that emerges in current phenomenological thought and
French feminism, may reassert itself-with a vengeance. 84 If that
10 See, e.g., ZILLIAN EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY OF THE LAW (1988), 33-36, 54
("The language of law silences woman," discussing Luce Irigaray's thought).
81 Robert Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J.
455 (1984).
8 See Stanley Cavell, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Melodrama of the Unknown
Woman, in IMAGES IN OUR SOULS, 33-40 (J. Smith, W. Kerrigan eds. 1987); EMMANUEL
LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY, 155 (1971); ALPHONSO LINGIS, PHENOMENOLOGICAL
EXPLANATIONS (1986); In MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (W. Kaufmann trans. 1970), the
"You" is crucially feminine.
83 This fear is one female academics cannot avoid; I speak to that in Hartigan, supra
note 26, and the story in that essay of how I changed my voice is the one that my women
students find most difficult.E4 This reassertion may come in the guise of the punishing father or the omnipotent
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were to be so, all Others would suffer, masculine and feminine
alike.85
Cover makes an allusion to his own use of command that
suggests that it cannot, however, be dispensed with in a world that
contains evil. He recommends the notion of mitzvah, of obligation
on the part of the citizen, but also suggests we keep the language
of rights in order to protect participation by those not already
effectively enfranchised. For those who have political power, the
obligation side is more central.
Yet as I scan my own-our own-privileged position in
the world social order and the national social order, as I
attend the spiritual and material blessings of my life and
the rather obvious connection that some of these have
with the suffering of others-it seems to me that the
rhetoric of obligation speaks more sharply to me than that
of rights. 86
Command does speak sharply, and it seems prudent for those less
advantaged to retain the commanded, binding protections of social
contract, of rights. (The optimistic or communitarian construction
of this is that the fulfillment of the obligations of granting rights to
others is indeed what will fulfill the rights-granter. The entire quest
might remain primarily positive, not a zero-sum binding of the
relatively advantaged.)
The notion of binding as constriction rather than as bonding,
of obligation not as ob ligare, tying together, but as obliging,
forcing, is central to Rawls' social contract. This is not surprising,
given how phobic Rawls is about religion 87 (which is re ligare,
bonding together again). Rawls specifically excludes all religious
motivations from the realm of the good.8 8 He fears the religious
mother-in the Wizard of Oz, the most terrifying moment is when Auntie Em's face in the
crystal is overlaid/overcome by the mocking echo of the wicked witch of the West (see
note 110 infra).
8- Cavell, supra note 64; Buber, supra note 82; JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930) esp. 18-20; ALPHONSO LINGIS, DEATHBOUND SumEcriviry (1989); Levinas,
supra note 82 (esp. § II D "The Dwelling"); Irigaray, supra note 19.
6 Cover, supra note 65, at 73.
17 See Steven Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby,
1987 DuKE L.J. 977.
"E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE 554 (1971) (to choose God as our one
"end" is irrational or "mad"); id. at 365 (civil disobedience may not be justified on religious
grounds).
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wars. He denigrates religiously-based civil disobedience, placing
it at distinct disadvantage in relation to conscience-based objec-
tions to government action. And he refuses an overall notion of
the good-as in the goodness of God's creation. More tellingly, he
informs us that his intention in setting up the veil of ignorance and
the original position is to bind the entrant into a position from
which he cannot extricate himself.89 Once the initial choices have
been made, the chooser, Rawls hopes, will be forced to accept the
reasonable consequences of his actions. It is like tricking someone
into virtue, or, worse, like programming them. This is "structurally
coercive" discourse. 90 Rawls leaves no room for freedom, for cre-
ativity, for play. His obligation is commanding indeed.
The response to a morality of command is one of invitation.
This corresponds to the use of language that James Boyd White
recommends, a use which persuades, which creates an inviting
text.9' (This is intended to be such a text.) The difference is one
of freedom, of the affirmative movement of assent. To choose to
comply with command, even the all-wise command of God, is to
obey rather than to embrace. 92 To respond to an invitation is both
to know that one can say no, and to experience the positive draw
of the choice being made. Even if these choices, embedded in a
life shot through with tragedy, are also painful, the response to
invitation is an affirmation, a reaching toward the whole. This is
the image of law that the gift of Torah at Sinai narrates and that
the epistles of the apostle Paul, read carefully, affirm. It is not
merely the avoidance of the curse of Deuteronomy; it is the active
choice of blessing. This choice is both knowing and unknowing;
we stand in our relationship with God at each moment, choosing
life and law that is, like God, becoming for us. We do not fully
know, yet we decide. This is the integral movement of trust.
89 Id. The conditions of the veil of ignorance are ones we "do in fact accept," id. at
21, though they were chosen by the author to set bounds, id. at 18, which eventually both
"hold unconditionally," id. at 115, and may establish a "bond" to the status quo, id. at 116.
His qualifying words lose their apparent power to free the reader when, in later commentary,
he admits the book is an apologetic work. See, e.g., Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
90 Cf. White, supra note 25, at 2017.
91 JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW xi (1985). But see, Richard Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and
Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543, 547-49, 581 (1988).
92 Command is "law as the voice of the father" rather than the acceptance of the
mother. See, e.g., Elisabeth Moltmann Wendel, Self-Love and Self-Acceptance, in LovE:
THE FOUNDATION OF HOPE (1988). See also supra note 72 and infra note 124.
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Trust is key to language and to law. Without some sense of
trust in the law, all compliance is coerced. Without some sense of
trust of the other with whom we speak, we cannot expect, or hope,
to communicate across the gap between other minds. 93 Without
trust, there is no covenant, no contract, no conversation, no law.94
Where does this basic trust come from, in a radically plural world?
We manifest it every day, as we speak to strangers and stranger-
friends, as if they could understand. 95 We also manifest distrust
and difference. And that is one surprise about the invitation: I am
talking to you not about trusting your old icons of law, but about
listening to mine, and those of people of color and of other despised
difference. (I will admit for this moment that every person partic-
ipates in despised difference, is an Outsider, but I am asking you
to read for now experiencing yourself as responsible insider, as
well as invited Outsider.) I am inviting you to listen to the victims
of law, in order to find the law that was gifted.
D. Listening
The first invitation is to listen to those who were victims of
one historical use of law that most perverted law, of the orderly
and lawlike extermination of six million Jews and millions of other
"undesirables. ' '96 In order to recreate a public order, those victims
will have to be open to invitation, to affirm the "ongoingness of
time. '' 97 Some of the scions of the Holocaust have begun to do so,
but it is no happenstance that Derrida, Ackerman, Nagel and Fish,
rather than overtly affirming values, deconstruct justifications. As
all theology after the Holocaust must know itself changed, so must
all political theory and law.98 Harold Berman, in support of an
9 Nicholas Lash reads this necessity for trust as the underlying insight of Martin
Buber, especially in BUBER, ECLIPSE OF GOD, (1952). LASH, EASTER IN ORDINARY chs.
12, 13 (1988).
94 For a suggestion that the contract between men and women is up for grabs, see
Remarks at the Alternative Feminist Theories of Contract Panel, AALS Annual Meeting,(January 1989) (on tape available from AALS); see also CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT (1988).
95 See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS (1985).
9 See Jack Boozer, Law Without Justice (rev. ed. June 1989, forthcoming).
97 For the invitation to embrace time from now on, see CAROLE OCHS, AN ASCENT TO
Joy 64 (1986) and The Noah Paradox (forthcoming in 1991).
93 Johannes Baptiste Metz, Christians and Jews After Auschwitz in THE EMERGENT
CHURCH 17 (1981); Jurgen Moltmann, Love, Death, Eternal Life: Theology of Hope, the




integrative jurisprudence that must take account of history, cites
examples of legal argument (one by German social philosopher
Jirgen Habermas) that ground in the historical fact of attempted
genocide by the Nazis. Such examples are unavoidable. Some
historical events overwhelm abstract reasoning; even when such
reasons might be advanced, they are patently inappropriate in the
face of such reality.99
Some of those who actually experienced the Holocaust and
the American wounds of racism have spoken with hope;100 some
are just finding a voice to do so; some are struggling with voice-
lessness that comes, I speculate, from the realization of the en-
ormity of the move such words would be. From the moment that
he answered his fellow inmates' calls of "Where is God?" in the
face of the hanging of a Jewish child in the death camps with
"Here He is ..... ".101 Elie Weisel spoke with hope, even if it was
the hope of demanding response from God. Many years later,
Jewish theologian Carol Ochs embodies the second prophetic turn,
the turn after repentance and atonement, to rejoicing, 10 2 by em-
bracing the ongoingness of time. That is not an ahistorical em-
brace; Ochs has not failed to heed the call to remember, but has
made the awesome movement that only those who have lived with
the via negativa can make authentically, the beginning of the via
positiva. It is because of the depth to which the apophatic, the
God-is-not-that, the negative image of God, has been taken, that
such a positive (cataphatic) turn can be taken. Derrida's reliance
on such negative theology as that of Isaac Luria and the Lurianic
kabbalah is postulated by Thomas J.J. Altizer. 0 3 The thorough-
going negation of any sense of space or free belief has been argued
by commentators like Stanley Fish. °4 The way has been cleared
99 Harold Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 791 (1988).
100 See, e.g., GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1975); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); JOHN NEIHARDT, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SIOUX (1925).
101 ELIE WEISEL, NIGHT 62 (1960).
102 FRANCIS DORFF, THE ART OF PASSING OVER: AN INVITATION TO LIVING CREA-
TIVELY (1988).
103 Thomas J.J. Altizer, History as Apocalypse in DECONSTRUCTION AND THEOLOGY,
(1982); but see Derrida, infra note 110.
,04 See Fish, supra note 45 at 1007; Fish, infra note 106. In the latter, Fish says that
for such space, to be the god-like person discussed below, one would need to be created
by a living God (at 1007). As one of my students, Jean Brestel, noted, "Why is he so angry
that the only answer is God?"
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for the Way(s). There is a continuing place for those who say no,
so long as it is a no allowing some opening to the possibility of
truth. (Richard Rorty denies that he is interested in goodness and
truth any more, but he keeps hanging around those who are; his
writings betray his real interest, even if they also state a regrettable
closed-spiritedness and thus closed-mindedness on God and good-
ness.) 105 Fish himself names the positive face of the move beyond
perspectives, citing Keats' praise of Shakespeare as the rare per-
son to achieve the stance of Negative Capability. 0 6 Fish identifies
such a stance as that of rising above perspectivism as a God, but
then argues as if there were never such persons or such moments,
but only undifferentiated, relative, fully constrained beliefs.10 7 Per-
haps it is easier for the believer to acknowledge such invaluable
transcendent moments, because the believer EXPERIENCES that
belief is punctuated moment to moment with doubt, that the mo-
ment of connection and the moment of loss are at some level
phenomenologically simultaneous. The minds of believers will al-
ways come up with disbelief, and external dialogue will help deal
with the permanent fear of loss that any belief in God engenders
(we believe in God; we know that at each moment we are not fully
Present with God, and we must yearn for more; in our lack, we
wonder if there really is a God).
Such radically negative projects as those of Fish and Derrida
are the first movement in the recognition of a new step toward
Meister Eckhart's and the Zohar's and the Hassidim's God-be-
yond-God. 0 8 We come to know God, with shards of idolatry in-
evitably embedded in our relationship; we lose God as if aban-
doned; we destroy all vestiges, like a child who did not want that
parent anyway, defiantly, independently. And then if we will lis-
ten, 109 we will hear and be heard anew.
105 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989); RORTY, CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 24, 34 (1982).
106 Stanley Fish, Unger and Milton, 1988 DUKE L.J. 975, 1005.
107 Id. at 1006 ("If you are a finite being... you are wholly situated ... your every
capability is ... a reflection and extension of the system of belief that bespeaks you and
your possibilities, and there is nothing negative (detached, independent, free) to nurture.").
'0 YOUR WORD Is FIRE (A. Green ed. 1977); ZOHAR: THE BOOK OF ENLIGHTENMENT
(D.C. Matt trans. 1983); TREATISES AND SERMONS OF MEISTER ECKHART (J.M. Clark &
J.V. Skinner trans. 1958); see, e.g., ALPHONSO LINGIS, PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPLANA-
TIONS 42 (1986); see infra note 110.
109 Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love, Consciousness and
Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1014 (1989).
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E. Rejoicing in the Ordinary
Altizer names Derrida's move as a "profound and purely neg-
ative assault upon faith and revelation" which comes from the only
post-modem thinker really to take account of the Holocaust, and
thus as "a uniquely twentieth-century Jewish witness to bring the
whole tradition of modem Christianity to an end, and thereby make
possible a new Christian beginning."110
But Derrida does not stand alone for the Jewish or Hebraic
witness, because previously silent voices, including those of Jew-
ish women, stand for something newer, something positive-for
rejoicing. Amy Eilberg, the first contemporary Conservative
woman rabbi in the United States, experienced, with the birth of
her daughter, rebirth and joy not contained by the intellectual
doctrines of feminist theologies, and came to know a God who not
only commands, but also nurtures."i She was, in her words, re-
born, experiencing "[the] shift [of the ground beneath [her] rela-
tionship with Jewish law.' 12 Law does not merely command. It
invites to fullness, from the emptiness through which we had to
pass and in which all fullness still takes place.
The importance of the voice of Jewish women is what liber-
ation theologians call the authority of those who suffer.113 This
authority is both ontological and epistemological; philosopher
Claudia Card suggests that the very nature of women's perspec-
tives on moral issues is changed by the fact of their moral wound-
110 Altizer, supra note 103, at 150-51; Drucilla Cornell commented that this reading of
Derrida does not take account of his more recent work, which she finds grounded in an
affirmation of love, especially THE POST CARD (A. Bass trans. 1987). My first forays into
Derrida's latest work on Heidegger suggested the dust jacket's interrogatory ("To whom
or what does one say yes?") might point to this turn. In April, 1990 this note and all other
references to Derrida changed because of my dinnertable meeting and participation with
him in a roundtable, but I leave this text as it was because that is another story. The change
is significant, and I am moved to note it because Derrida has expressed pain at the
unwillingness/inability of commentators to read (ne peut/ne veut, which he elides to ne
pveut) his texts in good faith. See Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Frag-
ments, 15 CRar. INQ. 812 (P. Kamuf, trans. 1989).
1 Amy Eilberg, Encountering a Feminine God, 14 MOMENT 34, 36 (Apr. 1989).
112 Id. at 35.
"' JOHANNES BAPTISTE METZ, Christians and Jews after Auschwitz in THE EMERGENT
CHURCH 18 (1987); REBECCA CHOPP, THE PRAXIS OF SUFFERING: AN INTERPRETATION OF
LIBERATION AND POLITICAL THEOLOGIES (1987). No one text can take account of all the
particular wounds of being outside; the list is never ending-gay, lesbian, Asian, Arab,
Jew, disabled.
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edness.1 4 Once those who have been oppressed recognize that
fact, their return to ordinary knowledge is enriched by a way of
knowing that is unavailable to rational cognition alone." 5 Along
with the distinctiveness of women's, blacks', Jews', Hispanics',
native Americans' voices, there is a corresponding way of listening
that each requires. 1 6 How can such diverse listening take place in
the face of the uniformity of the law?
There are several levels of answer to this fundamental plural-
ity-and-unity question. One that requires some religious language,
but that can be translated into depth psychology or Emersonian
essay, is that of Pentecost. It is not coincidence that the Jewish
Pentecost, Shavuot, is the commemoration of the Sinai gift of law,
while the Christian celebration is of the Jewish disciples of Jesus
speaking to an assembled crowd from all nations. The Torah of
Sinai is for all nations; the beginning of the transparency of that
Torah to all was the gift of spirit called "interpretation of tongues";
in this case, the tongue was a version of Hebrew, Aramaic. We
can hear others speak, despite their and our radical particularity,
because of the medium of the spirit, because God is with us.
The gift usually brought to mind by reference to the Christian
Pentecost is the gift of speech to the apostles, who were suddenly,
after hiding in a house for fifty days, able to proclaim the good
news. The gift of tongues (glossolalia) to those especially called,
is not what I mean here; I point to the gift given to all humankind,
of having "ears to hear." The gift of Sinai, Torah, is celebrated at
Shavuot by all-night study, the purposeful activity that allows
comprehension of the Law. The point of both Jewish and Christian
Pentecosts is the point of furthest comprehension of the Word-
the gift is to the listeners, the studiers (the readers)-and the
listeners and studiers are gifted. They heard each in his or her own
tongue, because it was given to them as ordinary people to un-
derstand. They were connected, Israelites and those not from
Israel, by the descent of the Holy Spirit. This was an event in
14 Claudia Card, Women's Voices and Ethical Ideals: Must We Mean What We Say?,
ETHIcS, Oct. 1988 at 125. The moral woundedness of the advantaged, the alienated white
male of high status can be found through the logic of relationship as in notes 17, 67. But it
is for the advantaged to name their own woundedness, in solidarity with all others.
n5 Dorothee Soelle, Suffering and Learning in SUFFERING (1975). To be an adult,
Dorothee-Soelle suggests, is what is learned.
116 Sara Ruddick, Remarks on the Sexual Politics of Reason in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY 245 (1987) (cited in Card, supra note 114).
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human history that connected all human "tacit understandings" so
that the return from Babel was announced again.117
F. Out of Silence
That return can be guided by the authority of the oppressed,
but more constructively by the eloquence of the oppressed. Patri-
cia Williams' Alchemical Notes is both statement and exemplar.11
Beginning with a meta-story that attributes to the deconstructors
the "knowledge of Undoing Words" she places them in a realm
"Beyond the Power of Words."119 What she tells in her story is
how law as it has been understood (law as rights, which even
Cover notes must be retained as we deepen towards Law)12 0 has
power for blacks and for women and for black women, like her.
That history of power cannot be abandoned into anarchy and
formlessness, but must be re-enveloped in a new story, which she
begins in her final section "Conclusion (In Which I Attempt to
Rescue From Silence Feelings for Which There Are No
Words). '12' She has been talking about gift, as the erotic attraction
of life as a fount of relationship. She equates rights with the
conscious commitments in the psyche; the corresponding role of
gift seems to be that which invites beyond the conscious into the
realm of becoming. She calls for a move from the visible world of
owning gold, to a world transformed by our being owned by "a
luminous golden spirit."122 Williams has told a hard story of a black
woman's oppression, of even now her being turned away from
neighborhoods by realtors because of her race; she has authority
to claim both the empowerment of rights and the aspiration of
spirit.
In order to rescue becoming from silence, Williams uses feel-
ings. Why does she think feelings need to become worded? 23 The
content of her last section gives the answer: feelings are the traces
"7 This reading of the spirit as gift to all, of the interpretation of foreign tongues as
the antidote to Babel, is not uncommon. See THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE WITH
THE APOCRYPHA 1320-21 (1973).
"I Williams, supra note 7, at 401.
"9 Id. at 401-02.
120 Cover, supra note 65, at 73.
"I Williams, supra note 7, at 427.
t2 Id. at 433.
123 See Susan Miller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 ETHICS
229 (1989).
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that lead us to the unknown place of waiting from which creation
springs. She creates because she cares, as her earlier story of
walking the halls of the courthouse as a black woman lawyer tells
us. Here is desire, eros,1 24 the spring of invitation that draws-and
that, if unacknowledged consciously, drives. It is Cavell's differ-
ence between bonding and binding: "In the realm of the figurative,
our words are not felt as confining but as releasing, or not as
binding but as bonding. (This realm is neither outside nor inside
language games)." 125 Feeling, desire, wanting, longing-all these
aspects of human life are not within the control of reason in the
end. The threat that they pose is that they will not respond to
command. They are out of control.
G. Out of Control
During my federal clerkship, one of the state's more promi-
nent politician lawyers grabbed me around the waist in the judge's
conference room, and made a comment he thought I would find
complimentary. I found it so intrusive that it took me twenty
minutes and a conference with my (male) co-clerk to settle into a
clear response. I told him I had never been subjected to such an
inappropriate comment in my professional life, and I was insulted.
After an initial reaction of fear that I would somehow go public
and sully his reputation, he backed off for a couple of hours. After
lunch, he approached me on a procedural question over which the
law clerks had jurisdiction; I gave a thoroughly business-like reply.
He then began a reasonably thoughtful apology. What he had been
doing with the first question was testing to see if I were rational;
I knew that from my own learned ambivalence. Having stepped
outside accepted decorum in an easy-going Southern federal court,
I was untrustworthy until tested for sanity. My judge from then
on referred to me as out of control; I have on my office wall a
letter from him signed over his name and the subscript "Male
Chauvinist."
My judge was and is a profoundly courageous and luminous,
good person, but he is a Southerner in his mid-seventies and had
124 See PLATO, SYMPOSIUM, PHAEDRUS in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Cairns
& Hamilton eds. 1961); Audre Lorde, Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power in WEAVING
THE VISIONS: NEW PATTERNS IN FEMINIST SPIRITUALITY 208 (Judith Plaskow & Carol
Christ eds. 1989).
12 STANLEY CAVELL, IN QUEST OF THE ORDINARY 148 (1988).
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not moved beyond both delighting in and recoiling from what he
called my remarkable combination of thinking and feeling-that
is, I felt and said so, but still thought. I am unsure if he ever
realized that perhaps my depth of feeling AIDED my thinking,
that it fueled my desire to understand, and gave life to the concepts
of my mind. He knew that we loved each other and fought a lot,
and that there was faithfulness and even respect in my being out
of control, but it frightened him.
If you talk to me, you can determine that even in my most
lucid, analytical moments, I believe in Mystery. All the philosophy,
the years of academic life, and ten years of Quaker agnosticism
finally deepened the sophistication with which I hold (and let go
of) that belief. But it is when I call ultimate reality "spiritual" or
"religious" that people become most frightened-and, would they
admit it, most fascinated (like my friend Robert Audi). I remember
the dinner-table conversation right after the panel on advocacy, in
which he and other rationalists talked with bemusement of sons
who had inexplicably joined the church; they listened to my story
of the powerful spiritual bonding and communication I had expe-
rienced at a theology conference that summer. The experience was
credible in part because it was in a week-long retreat with Parker
and Sally Palmer and Henri Nouwen (I didn't tell them that many
of us "learned" the most from Sally's nonverbal exercises and the
Quaker silence); Henri and Parker have gotten tenure and written
academically respectable books.12 6 They made the milieu trust-
worthy. The reasoners could risk fascination.
H. The Voice of Spirit
But life in the academy goes on, and Robert published his
major piece in Philosophy and Public Affairs on church and
state' 27-still advocating the moral superiority of never speaking
on matters of potential public action from any but a fundamentally
secular motivation. With a most curious language, he gives cre-
dence to "both head and heart" by asking to restrict the role of
126 1 have cited their books before, and find them full of words of insight. See PARKER
PALMER, To KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN: A SPIRITUALITY OF EDUCATION (1983); see also
HENRI NOUWEN, CLOWNING IN ROME (1979).
127 Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizen-
ship, 18 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
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religious persons in their most conscientious inner regions, ex-
horting them to avoid the rationalizations that might tempt them
to convince themselves that positions that they REALLY hold for
religious reasons, they could very well almost hold for secular
reasons, so (they falsely think) they do hold them for secular
reasons and are thus free to speak.128 For Audi, even if highly
plausible secular reasons exist for something that the believer
might advocate that the government do, reasons that the believer
respects, unless the conscientious person of faith is quite sure that
any advocacy stems from the secular first, she must be silent.
For some of us, that would require a choice between lifelong
silence about justice, and idolatry of the state. Audi thinks that
"'one can live one's faith . . . while constraining one's efforts in
supporting restrictive laws and policies, or indeed other sorts of
legislation or social programs, in accord with the principle of sec-
ular motivation," apparently because religion commands loving
one's neighbors. 129 But he is right only if the faithful one is willing
to give voice only to primarily secular urgings to speak. He seems
to miss the whole point of the "other" commandment: to love God
with all one's heart and mind and soul and strength. To be faithful
to that commandment is to speak primarily out of love of God.
Audi would banish the wisdom and fidelity of the heart, and the
primacy of God's light in the mind. Part of his further misappre-
hension of the movements of heart and soul turns on his equation
of (his version of) "rational" with the capacity to discern correct
moral principles, and those two in turn with doing good. In fact,
the key gesture he makes to persuade a believer, that "if. . . a
moral or political view is grounded in God's will, God's goodness
may plausibly be taken to imply that some secular basis is acces-
sible to rational inquiry,"1 30 demonstrates that his entire argument
works only if God has so constructed the world. God is much
more interesting than to serve merely as the suppressed premise
of Audi's long, "rational," dry argument.
Audi's real fear comes out at the end. He urges that such
secular trustworthiness is necessary so "the nonreligious will not
feel alienated or be denied adequate respect.' 3' Further, as "we
M Id. at 288.
129 Id. at 294.
,
30 Id. at 295.
"3 Id. at 295.
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are prone to extremes in the service of our holy causes" we cannot
adequately participate in "the crucible of free discussion" because
God-talkers function like "the meeting of an irresistible force with
an immovable object.' 1 32 This is what Steven Carter has called the
liberal fear and intolerance of religion. 133 It is an anxiety that James
Boyd White suggests may be not totally fear of religious oppres-
sion, but also fear of religious truth.134 "Religion" is potentially
fearsome, so that Buber claimed it was the primal danger of hu-
mankind, but that is because of the destructive power of its perv-
ersion, rather than its lack of intrinsic reality or goodness.1 35
The only people from whom Audi asks heart-searching, con-
scientious respect of others to the point of abandoning their source
of final grounding, are believers. Yet he says that those who be-
lieve in God "tend to be confident that proponents of different
interpretations-are in error."'1 36 In the best deconstructionist per-
spectivism, there is nothing to suggest that the religious perspec-
tive is any more deluded, negatively irrational, genuinely intoler-
ant, or systematically unselfconscious, than any other. Stanley
Fish delightfully argues that liberalism doesn't exist, precisely
because the high ground of the "rational" belongs to no one,
especially those wielding such basic critiques of all others' faiths.1 37
Robert Audi, in the public sphere (which he thinks he can distin-
guish from the personal or private), bases his foundational faith
on a particular brand of philosophical discourse he would call
reasonable. That is his public god.
He argues that those who do not believe will be alienated by
God talk. I reply that their alienation is far deeper than that, and
comes from a separation from the most central sources of speech.
He is concerned with wars of religion as are Rawls and now Mark
Tushnet.138 I reply that the most atrocious war of history was
2 Id. at 296.
133 Steven Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DUKE L.J. 977.
114 James Boyd White, Response to Roger Crampton's Article, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533
(1987).
'31 Nicholas Lash cites Buber in a BBC interview shortly before his death, remarking
on how glad he was that the word "religion" occurs nowhere in the Bible. Lash, supra
note 93, at 178. Buber of course used the word; see, e.g., MARTIN BUBER, Religion and
God's Rule in A BELIEVING HUMANISM (M. Friedman trans. 1967).
'36 Audi, supra note 127, at 296.
37 Fish, supra note 49.
£38 Mark Tushnet, Flourishing and the Problem of Evil, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1631, 1648-
50 (1989).
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fought on behalf of a purely secular vision made demonic by
containing all the power and passion of the unspoken desires of
the human heart within an idea of a single secular yet sacred
nation. As humans intensify their humanity, they will intensify
both thinking and feeling-and all the other hallmark aspects of
the human. If we do not speak to the full array of human qualities,
the unspoken will drive us, unknowingly unknowing, to horror like
World War II.
Cavell names horror as that which we must face in the human.
We are capable of great good; we are capable of commensurate
evil.., free will, even with grace, is no guarantee. Only attending
to reality, to the human "as inherently strange, say unstable, its
quotidian as forever fantastic,"1 39 will we answer the invitation to
life-and only in answering the invitation will we avoid evil. There
is no safe staying still, unless it is to listen. We must face the
"horrified vision of ordinariness," "the acknowledgement of oth-
erness, specifically as a spiritual task" in Cavell's words,' 40-but
this is not quite the heroic task even Cavell implies. It is a matter
of ordinary, everyday invitation.
"[T]he most vital words die when spoken. This is why God
begins where words end.' 41 What lies just beyond words is what
ties together the universe. That same Being is what creates and
sustains what Cavell calls our "attunement with one another.' 1 42
The only real power is always coming into being within our form
of life, in Wittgenstein's phrase, and always begins beyond words.
Socrates remembered that the greatest power was not to write on
a page, but to speak to the heart, to inscribe on the soul. 43 We
may speak and write of Socrates, all the same, and we should.
But as Heschel remarks, philosophy begins in wonder, and reli-
gious insights "have to be carried over a long distance to reach
expression, and they may easily.., perish on the way from the
heart to the lips."'144 Language traveling from potential to real
makes a fragile transition into words. The "ineffable will only enter
a word in the way in which the hour to come will enter the path
119 Cavell, supra note 125, at 154.
140 Id. at 158.
141 ABRAHAM HESCHEL, MAN Is NOT ALONE 98 (1951).
142 Cavell, supra note 125, at 147.
143 PLATO, PHAEDRUS in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (H. Cairns & E. Ham-
ilton eds. 1961)
I" Heschel, supra note 141, at 98.
Law as Invitation
of time: when there shall be no other hours in the way. It will
speak when of all words only one will be worthwhile."' 145
Where does this language, having journeyed from heart and
mind into words, show itself in law? It manifests most clearly in
the law language spoken to juries and to clients. The more ordinary
people must be spoken to in law, the more lawyers must honor
the translation of dominant legalese into the ostensible poverty of
everyday speech. The role of juries is what will make us Insiders
more honest, more grounded, more alive to the eloquence of sim-
plicity. We must trust jurors not because they are infallible, but
because they are gifted listeners, recalling us to our "second nd-
ivet6," that is, to ourselves.
In addition, this renewed language can point to rules of law
that would change how courts find justice. The systematic role of
equity, which dwells on the particular, can be strengthened. What
counts as evidence can be transformed from the current system of
seemingly exacting standards, which in fact fall into the nebulous
realm of "hearsay" and "reliability," to a focus on remembering
rather than dismembering a witness' story. A shift from a scientis-
tic stress on supposed objectivity, to an intersubjective view of
verification, would allow the way people operate in their ordinary
lives to fashion rules of evidence. If, as Joseph Raz notes, we
begin to count divining for water as a way of knowing where water
is, then what is publicly acceptable as "knowing" changes. 146 If
courts harken to what persons count as verification when their
lives are on the line-that is, everyday-then courts will let the
"finders of fact" and of law hear more of the whole story.
III. Mystery
Why is the philosopher wrong and the rabbi right? Neither is
incomprehensible; neither's speech lacks coherence, or concern.
Both are good people. There are two main reasons that come to
mind, or two ways of trying to say one reason. What the rabbi
had is hope in God and clarity of heart. Thus he could trust mystery
openly. That trust in mystery led him to invitation which surprised
him. Early on in the colloquium, he invited me to come visit his
145 Id. at 99.
146 Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3, 34-36, 43 (1990).
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home and his synagogue, to meet his family and congregation,
though he did not fully understand why. Such meetings are not
easy. The experience of sameness and difference at the service on
Shabbat was so profound an experience of boundary and openness,
of worship of "that One" in a faithful community of strangers
accessible by love, that I was overcome. Perhaps this is, with its
costliness, what one commentator calls the "joyous shock of dif-
ference.' 147 My friend still wonders where this "pesky Christian"
woman came from, and I still do not know whether I understand
the doctrine of election (he said I'll get it . . .). But there is a
connection coming into being, and the celebration of that bond
came forth in our call and ability to be together in prayer, and then
to hope to talk of God (sometimes, we only talked of theology). 148
Hope for Pentecost, for moments of connection within what
George Steiner in After Babel calls "the translucent immediacy of
that primal, lost speech shared by God and [a]dam,"' 149 turns first
on resurrection. Paul Ricoeur locates Freedom in the Light of
Hope, along with Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, as flowing from resurrection, which is "aporetic" (skeptical,
contrary) and "alogical" not from lack of meaning but from a
surplus of meaning. "Resurrection surprises by being in excess in
comparison to the reality forsaken by God.' 50 This "superabund-
ance" is not only for the Greek scriptures, for the Christian texts
beyond the Hebraic: "Wisdom overflows the framework of the
Covenant, which is also the framework of the election of Israel
and the promise made to Israel. It is not by chance that more than
one sage in the biblical tradition was not Jewish."'15 Resurrection,
abundance rather than scarcity, promise rather than threat-these
characterize Torah, Ricoeur says. Invitation, rather than com-
mand, comes first. Mystery is not a threatening kind of being out
J47 Michael Eigen, The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan & Bion, 62 INT'L J. PSY-
CHOANALYSIS 413, 416 (1981).
1'4 When this paper was presented at the second annual Symposium on Law, Religion
and Ethics in October 1989, Douglas Sturm asked whether the way I saw invitation and
translation came from my grounding in a universalist tradition; I referred to the prediction
that I WOULD come to understand election, and that if that were so, somehow by meeting
that particularity in love, both my friend the particularist and I the universalist, would be
right, together, in paradox. See DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE: A JEWISH
JUSTIFICATION (1989).
149 GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL 474 (1975). Steiner also notes that, according to
the kabbalah, the time without translation is the time of redemption.
'" PAUL RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 165 (1980).
151 Id. at 85.
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of control, a rigid irrationality, a start to religious war. It is a
promising invitation. It is not carelessly made, this invitation; it
lives close to death, the fear of which Ernest Becker (a non-
believer) convincingly portrays as the hidden source of anxiety in
the modern world. 152 Steiner tells us that translation is flawless
when it is close to death, 153 and death and Pentecost are nearly
contiguous. What lies between them is resurrection.1 54
A. Resurrection
My friend the rabbi knows the role of resurrection, which he
addressed in his Yom Kippur sermon this year of 5750. The writer
Dennis Praeger had observed that though it is clear that Judaism
has a belief in life after death, most Jews will say it doesn't. Despite
the belief's appearance in the second paragraph of the Amidah,
prayed repeatedly during the day, Jews seem embarrassed by the
idea of it. As my friend noted, our psychology professor might
laugh at us. In response, my friend quotes Arthur A. Cohen, editor
of Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought,155 in his essay on
resurrection, 156 and then paraphrases him: "As hard as it is to say
that you should believe this, I cannot discard it; I can only keep
it in trust, to hand over to a generation when it will be easier to
believe."
And it is in resurrection that we are reminded of what Torah
is first-a gift of God's love. Law is invitation because before it
was a threat, Law was a promise. The symbol of Torah, of the
Law, is and was Israel's emblem of Promise. The symbol of.Res-
urrection is for Christians the announcement of the Promise once
again. But Christians believe in the Law to be fulfilled, and Jews
believe in resurrection.
"52 ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973).
113 Steiner, supra note 149, at 37.
15 In the Christian calendar, Good Friday precedes Easter, which precedes Pentecost
(the descent of the Holy Spirit) by 50 days. In the Jewish year, Passover [Pesach] precedes
Shavuot/Pentecost, by 50 days.
1s Arthur Cohen, Resurrection of the Dead, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RELIGIOUS
THOUGHT: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON CRITICAL CONCEPTS, MOVEMENTS, AND BELIEFS 807-13
(1988).
116 Hayim Goren Perelmuter claims that resurrection is one of the three key themes of
Rabbinic Judaism dating to the early Common Era. See HAYIM GOREN PERELMUTER,
SIBLINGS: RABBINIC JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY (1989).
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For ancient Israel, the Law is the way that leads from
promise to fulfillment. Covenant, Law, Freedom, as
power to obey or disobey, are derivative aspects of the
promise. The Law imposes (gebietet) what the promise
proposes (bietet). The commandment is thus the ethical
face of the promise. Of course, with Saint Paul, this
obedience is no longer transcribed in terms of law; obe-
dience to the Law is no longer the sign of the efficacy of
the promise; rather, the Resurrection is the sign. 157
Ricoeur cites Buber as making clear the promise of Law, so that
I venture that both Law and Resurrection are signs of the invita-
tion, of the promise, of the God who is coming rather than the
God of present, completed triumph.
B. Dispensation
The God who is coming is also present with us, as spirit and
hope. We are already resurrected-not finally, but from the many
deaths of life fully lived. There is a history to the announcement
of this resurrection, however. We can only claim it because we
have returned as prodigal children, and it must be first spoken by
the Outsider. In 1988 I found myself saying to Carol Ochs, after
her presentation of the first stories of the via positiva, that her
movement was gift because I realized that in some sense I had
been waiting for dispensation from her in her Jewish particularity
and her womanhood, to claim resurrection. In 1989 Nicholas Lash
said he is "almost tempted to say that, in the shadow cast by the
Holocaust, a shadow eclipsing God in the eclipse of relationship,
the Christian requires permission from the Jew to sing the Easter
'Alleluia. ' ' ' 158 This requires, he says, forgiveness; dispensation'59
is both a letting go of sin and a system of promises and rules
divinely ordained and administered-it is a face of Torah. It is also
the luminous golden spirit of Patricia Williams (and Alice Walker
157 Ricoeur, supra note 150, at 162.
118 Lash, supra note 93, at 211.
'"9 WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) (1971).
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and Zora Neale Hurston), and the threat of resurrection of Julia
Esquivel:
It isn't the noise in the streets
that keeps us from resting, my friend,
There is something here within us
which doesn't let us sleep,
which doesn't let us rest,
which doesn't stop pounding
deep inside,
it is the silent, warm weeping
of Indian women without their husbands,
it is the sad gaze of the children
fixed there beyond memory,
in the very pupil of our eyes
which during sleep,




Now six of them have left us,
and nine in Rabindl,
and two, plus two, plus two,
and ten, a hundred, a thousand,
a whole army




Accompany us then on this vigil
and you will know what it is to dream!
You will then know
how marvelous it is
to live threatened with Resurrection!
To dream awake,
to keep watch asleep,
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to live while dying
and to already know oneself
resurrected! 60
One reason, I think, that my friend could preach of resurrec-
tion this year is that we both risked translation. The other part of
his last-day message to me was, "Thank you for coming across
the bridge to meet me." I had asked about Torah, and halacha,
and aggada and kavanah (more than once!), and listened. But he
also risked translation, by coming across the unfamiliar bridge of
relationship. I was very careful of his tradition, have learned the
Hebrew alphabet, read and listened. He was very careful of my
feelings, learned about how I experience both my tradition and
myself in relationship. There were losses in translation between
us; there were overwhelming, surprising gains. In an intensely
spiritual relationship, there was idolatry, and iconoclasm, suffering
and even death-but there is, more deeply, hoped-for resurrection.
That resurrection's cost, to be entered into by both Jew and Chris-
tian, may be more than we can fully comprehend; Jewish philos-
opher Emil Fackenheim says that "[o]nly if we share in the anguish
of the victims dare we affirm their resurrection.' 6' There is no
guarantee we are up to what is required, but we hope.
C. Absence and Presence
The hope and the resurrection are prelude for the advent of
Pentecost, for the gift of the Spirit. Pentecost is gift, but deeper
life brings with it deeper suffering, cost. Our God is both Absent
and Present, both with us and hidden; we are both loved and
abandoned by the withdrawal that gives us the space to be free.
The cost is the absence, tzimtzum: 162 Christ says that He must
leave, because unless He leaves, the Spirit will not come. 63 The
cost is also the space, the freedom to sin, to do evil. We are free-
but we are not alone, and so the freedom to do evil can be named:
we have, along with freedom for greater good than has been
'60 JULIA ESQUIVEL, They Have Threatened Us With Resurrection, in THREATENED
WITH RESURRECTION: PRAYERS AND POEMS FROM AN EXILED GUATEMALAN 59 (1982).
161 EMIL FACKENHEIM, WHAT IS JUDAISM? 274 (1987).




known, freedom to repeat the Holocaust, and worse. 164 Yet Pen-
tecost is the announcement, with rush of wind and tongues and
bush of fire, that we are connected again. The gift is among us, as
Jeremiah's prophecy of new covenant. It is the one heart, and
with the reality of that one heart, brother shall no longer tell sister
to know the Holy One, because each shall know, the least to the
greatest, because they are forgiven. 165
My friend the philosopher is thus safe from proselytizing. But
he also needs to know that he has created a reductio ad absurdum
that requires in response a statement of faith as a statement of
identity. It is because the law bears the imprint of the divine law,
as Cover says, that we should be about the business of appropri-
ating a new Torah together. This requires disclosure and trust.
Trust and disclosure are central to how we can know to whom we
are talking, and how we can expect to be received. 166.Anew Torah
even (though not primarily) participating in the fully public realm
is possible because the Law can to some extent serve as medium.1 67
That medium is sustained by spirit and invites trust. Law need not
be primarily a defense against being wrong; it can ground in hope
of being right. Law need not serve solely as a threat to "translate"
the other out of existence, but more centrally as a movement
toward trustworthy translation.
Disclosure and translation are not easy. The best milieu for
those movements, and the best place of gestation for what remains
beyond the reach of words but enters the spoken from time to
time, is a clarity not of reason alone but of the whole person.
Perhaps it even requires prayer:
Praying means to take hold of a word, the end, so to
speak, of a line that leads to God. The greater the power,
'6 Some believe that the risk of Holocaust is greater under modem secularism than it
was under even medieval Christian anti-Judaism, as Nazism-in its typically secular denial
of transcendence-is a "distinctly modem phenomenon." Novak, supra note 148, at 5-14.
'6 Jeremiah 31:31-34.
'6 See Thomas Shaffer, Judges as Prophets (Book Review), 67 TEx. L. REv. 1327,
1338-40 (1989). Shaffer calls on Robert Burt, a provocative user of religious language, to
come forth about how much he really believes in such language, rather than just putting it
on the page. This is the kind of disclosure that both Cover and Richard John Neuhaus cite
in their discussion in Robert Cover, Richard Neuhaus, Robert Cahill, Theological Perspec-
tives (Symposium on the Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law), 5 J. LAW & RELIG.
95 (1987).
167 See MILNER BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY
(1985).
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the higher the ascent in the word. But praying also means
that the echo of the word falls like a plummet into the
depths of the soul. The purer the readiness, so much the
deeper penetrates the word. 168
My friend the rabbi is right, if such a thing exists, more than
my friend the philosopher, because he spoke in relation, lived in
hope, and listened with clarity of heart. His tradition, his vocation,
his milieu, his generation and even his politics, were considerably
more alien to mine than are those of my friend the philosopher.
Yet this bemused rabbi and this Catholic heretic have met and
were translated to one another. That involves, I believe, the pres-
ence of Reality with an internal movement that images dialogue.
This is the emerging vision of a lawful process in which, first God
speaks (whether only the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet, silent
aleph, or all of revelation), then we respond, and, finally, between
and among and within us, endlessly translating in living love, God
hears.
161 ABRAHAM HESCHEL, MAN'S QUEST FOR GOD: STUDIES IN PRAYER AND SYMBOLISM
30 (1954).
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